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Abstract
The paper examines the effects of local fiscal variables and local
economic conditions on exit decisions of Norwegian households.
The study takes advantage of a unique survey data set in which
respondents evaluate a range of local amenities and report
whether they intend to relocate. We find that municipal services
are important to exit decisions. Norwegian municipalities can
increase the population share of young, educated households by
improving living conditions for children and the quality of schools
and cultural services. The estimated effects of personal
unemployment, local unemployment and local wages on migration
plans become weaker when amenity variables are included,
indicating that capitalization of amenities cannot explain weak
effects of local economic conditions on migration in Europe.











The basic assumption underlying the Tiebout model (Tiebout, 1956) is that citizens
'vote with their feet' if they become sufficiently dissatisfied with the supply of local
government services. Mobility helps to reveal the preferences of residents, but may
cause an inefficient level and mix of local services if local authorities ignore
externalities when competing for firms and tax payers. Wilson (1999) and Wellisch
(2000) provide recent surveys of the potential benefits and costs of Tiebout mobility.
Whether interregional mobility has a practical effect on local fiscal choice, depends
on the impact of local policy variables on exit and entry decisions of households and
firms. Whereas several North-American studies have examined the importance of
local fiscal variables for location decisions, few studies have utilized European data.
This study examines the impact of local government services and fees on out-
migration decisions in Norway. The analysis is based on a unique survey data set in
which about 60.000 respondents evaluate a variety of local amenities, including local
services, and report whether they plan to move from the resident municipality. While
many studies of Tiebout mobility lack good proxy variables for service levels, our
data set allows a direct test of the impact of potential migrants' evaluation of local
services on the exit decision.
Another purpose of the study is to examine whether the estimated impact of local
economic conditions on migration intentions becomes biased when local amenities
are omitted from the analysis. European empirical studies of interregional migration
flows tend to find that migration is relatively unresponsive to local economic4
conditions (Eichengreen, 1993; Decressin and Fatás, 1995). One possible
explanation suggested by, among others, Pissarides and Wadsworth (1989) and
Antolin and Bover (1997), is that local amenities are capitalized into local
unemployment and wages so that these variables also capture effects of omitted
amenities. Our data set allows a test of this hypothesis.
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section presents a brief review of relevant
literature which also serves to motivate this paper's approach. A brief description of
the Norwegian local sector is included in section 3. Section 4 presents the data set.
Results are reported in section 5. Section 6 presents several robustness checks,
and section 7 contains concluding remarks.
2. Literature review and motivation of the paper
Studies which attempt to evalute whether location decisions of households are
affected by local government services and taxes can be divided into two categories.
One set of studies include local fiscal variables in regressions explaining migration
flows or individual location choices; the other set of studies examine the extent to
which local government services and taxes are capitalized into house prices and
wages. Virtually all existing studies within both categories employ data from North-
America.
Several studies find that location decisions are affected by the quality of schools.
Day (1992) provides evidence that spending on education dampens out-migration
from Canadian provinces, Herzog and Schlottmann (1986) and Fox, Herzog and
Schlottman (1989) find a negative impact of spending per pupil on out-migration5
from US metropolitan areas, and Nechyba and Strauss (1998) find that spending per
pupil play a major part in explaining destination choices of movers in the US.
Consistent with these results, several studies present evidence that school quality is
reflected in housing values (Haurin and Brasington 1996; Black 1999).
The results for other local services are not as clear-cut. For instance, Gyourko and
Tracy (1991) find evidence of capitalization of health services into wages and house
prices in the US, whereas Porell (1982) find no effect of health services on migration
flows between US geographical areas. Studies of the relation between mobility and
public safety, fire protection and local taxes also have produced mixed results.
One possible reason why the empirical literature on Tiebout mobility provides few
unambiguous conclusions is that data limitations often force researchers to use
proxies for local government services for which the relation to service levels is
uncertain. As pointed out by Charney (1993), many proxy variables may very well be
negatively related to service levels: few police officers may indicate a safe area, low
spending on fire control may reflect that buildings satisfy fire safety standards, and
low health spending may indicate that the population is relatively healthy. We can be
confident that our study does not suffer from this problem since the survey data set
provides direct information about the quality of local government services as
perceived by the decision makers, i.e. the persons who decide whether to relocate.
Few studies of Tiebout mobility utilize European data. Nelson and Wyzan (1989)
have examined migration flows between a subset of Swedish municipalities and find
weak effects of local fiscal variables. John, Downding and Biggs (1995) reach the
opposite conclusion based on a survey of movers between London boroughs.6
Both studies use rather small samples. Several European studies of household
mobility utilize large micro data sets, including Hughes and McCormick (1981, 1985,
1994), Dijk et al (1989), Pissarides and Wadsworth (1989), Antolin and Bover
(1997), Axelsson and Westerlund (1998) and Ahn et al (1999). However, none of
these studies include controls for local government services and taxes or other
amenities. This may explain why these studies generally find weak effects of local
economic conditions on mobility.
1 Since households prefer areas with favourable
living conditions and firms prefer areas with favourable producer conditions, the
spatial variation of rents, wages and unemployment will reflect the underlying
distribution of site-specific amenities (Roback, 1982; Blanchflower and Oswald,
1994). If capitalization of amenities has practical importance for local labour
markets, the estimated sensitivity of migration to local labour market slack will be
biased unless variation in amenities has been properly controlled for.
Weak or no effects of local economic conditions on migration may thus be
consistent with high geographic mobility if amenities have been omitted from the
analysis. The data set employed in this study allows a test of whether weak
estimated responses of migration to local economic conditions are due to omission
of amenities. Migration equations are estimated both with and without the
respondents' evaluation of local amenities as regressors, and the estimated effects
of personal unemployment, local unemployment and local wages of the two
equations are compared.
                    
1 Some studies even find that local unemployment has a negative impact on out-migration (Dijk et al,
1989; Hughes and McCormick, 1994; Antolin and Bover, 1997).7
3. The local sector in Norway
As in the other Nordic countries, local government in Norway plays an important role
in providing public services. About two-third of all government employees work in the
local sector of which the majority are employed by 435 municipalities. The main
services provided by the municipalities are: day care, primary education, cultural
services, primary health care, care for the elderly and infrastructure. The largest
sectors are primary education and care for the elderly which together account for
more than 50% of municipal spending. Publicly provided private services directed
towards specific subgroups of the population thus comprise a substantial part of the
municipal budget. There has been public concern that municipalities are shifting
spending away from care for the elderly towards day care and primary education in
order to attract young households. 
The main revenue sources of the municipalities are central government grants, local
income taxes and fees. Whereas income tax rates are determined by the state and
do not vary between municipalities, the municipalities have considerable discretion
to determine fees, of which the main component is infrastructure fees. As
infrastructure fees paid by an household do not depend on household income, a
high level of municipal spending and therefore of municipal fees may repel poor
households. The main policy issue is consequently whether Norwegian
municipalities are able to control the population shares of different demographic
groups by choosing the appropriate spending mix and/or the appropriate spending
level. The paper provides evidence on this issue.8
4. Data description
4.1 Survey data set
Since 1993, the Norwegian Gallup Institute (NGI) has conducted annual surveys in
which respondents evaluate a range of local amenities and indicate whether they
plan to move from the municipality. For some questions, the wording was changed in
1995; this study therefore uses the four surveys conducted in 1995-98.
Each year 25-50.000 persons are contacted, and about 50% return the
questionnaire. The 1995-98 surveys comprise 71.191 respondents of which 60.186
provided complete information about migration plans and personal characteristics
and resided in municipalities for which data about economic variables are available.
NGI does not store information about respondents who did not return the
questionnaire. However, since I allow the impact of local amenities and local
economic conditions on migration plans to vary across population subgroups,
selection bias is not likely to be important.
The question about migration is:
 Has the household specific plans to exit the municipality  during the next two years?
The questionnaire provides three response alternatives: 'Yes', 'No' and 'Do not
know'. 3307 persons (5.49%) responded 'Yes' and 4478 (7.44%) responded 'Do not
know'. The responses conform well with aggregate migration flows in Norway.
During 1995-98, the average annual rate of out-migration from municipalities was
4.71%.
We have no information about whether migration plans were actually executed. A9
recent study of the process of residential mobility by Kan (1999) concludes that
almost half of the households who plan to move are interrupted by unanticipated
events. However, to my knowledge, there exists no evidence suggesting that the
determinants of migration plans differ from the determinants of actual movements.  
The survey provides information about nearly all personal characteristics which
previous micro data studies have identified as important determinants of migration,
house tenure being the main exception. Experimentation with alternative
specifications suggested that the effects of family members and length of residence
are captured by dummy variables (see Table 1).
With the exception of infrastructure, the questionnaire includes questions about the
main services provided by Norwegian municipalities.
2 There are also questions
about some other local amenities: the climate, recreation and shopping
opportunities, personal safety and higher education services. Respondents are
asked to rank local amenities on a discretionary scale from one to six. The
questionnaire explains that one corresponds to 'very dissatisfied' and six to 'very
satisfied'. Table 1 presents summary statistics for the explanatory variables and the
wording of the amenity questions.
                    
2 The questionnaire includes separate questions about upper and lower primary schools. The questions
give very similar results; the paper presents results based on the latter question. The question about
primary health care refers to primary physician services as consultations by office-based general
practitioners represent the most important part of primary health care. There is no question about the
quality of child care, but the responses to the question about general living conditions for children are
positively correlated with the number of day care slots per child in preschool age.10
Table 1. Variable description
Personal characteristics
Variable Description Mean
Age Age of respondent 46.0
Male Dummy = 1 if respondent is male 0.502
High school Dummy = 1 if respondent has completed high school but not college 0.459
College Dummy = 1 if respondent has a college degree 0.312
Married Dummy = 1 if respondent is married 0.710
Family Dummy = 1 if familiy members ≥  4 0.331
Unemployed Dummy = 1 if respondent is unemployed 0.028
Out of workforce Dummy = 1 if respondent is not in the labour force 0.302
Mover Dummy = 1 if respondent moved to the municipality during the last five years. 0.085
Reported satisfaction
Variable Question:













The supply of cultural










Care for the elderly











The opportunities for outdoor recreation in























Annual municipal fees paid by owner of a
































Note: Sample size = 60.186
The response rate to the amenity questions varies between 97.6% (recreation) and
61.4% (primary education). People are most satisfied with safety and recreation
opportunities and least satisfied with public services, particularly primary health care
and care for the elderly.
    
4.2 Municipal fees
The NGI survey data set is matched with variables registered at the municipal and
county level. Annual information is available about the main fee component, fees
paid by house owners for basic infrastructure services. The variable is annual12
infrastructure fees paid by the owner of a standardized appartment.
3
                    
3 The 1995 survey was matched with 1996 data as information about infrastructure fees for 1995 is not
available.13
4.3 Area economic variables
Three area economic variables are considered: unemployment, nominal wages and
price of housing. Regional price indices for Norway are not available, and other
potential determinants of migration, such as vacancies and labour force
participation, were insignificant in all regressions. The area economic variables are
computed for two alternative geographical units, the municipality and the county.
4
Results for area economic variables registered at the county level are presented as
preliminary analyses indicated that local labour markets generally comprise several
municipalities.
Our unemployment variable is the number of unemployed registered at local labour
market offices scaled by the labour force. Annual regional data on wages are
available for manufacturing industries only. Our wage variable is the average hourly
manufacturing wage rate. The house price variable is computed from Statistics
Norway's data base of transactions of owner-occupied houses. Annual hedonic
regressions were estimated explaining the per m
2 price as a function of housing
attributes (the number of rooms and bathrooms, etc.) and a full set of county dummy
variables. The estimated county fixed effects are taken to represent the housing
prices of the respective counties in that year. As is evident from Table 1, among the
area economic variables there is most variation in unemployment and least variation
in wages.
                    




Empirical analyses of individual migration are typically conducted within the human
capital framework. Potential migrants are assumed to move if expected net
economic returns exceed the subjective costs of movement. Area economic
variables and personal characteristics are employed as proxy variables for economic
returns and subjective costs. This paper extends the standard framework by
including local amenities among the determinants of net returns to migration.
The empirical human capital model of migration is familiar and is not developed here
(see, e.g. Hughes and McCormick 1994 and Antonin and Bover 1997). I estimate a
probit model where the dependent variable, Exit, is coded one if the respondent
answers the question about migration plans by 'Yes' and zero otherwise.
In order not to loose observations due to missing responses to the amentity
questions, the amentity variables are interacted with dummies equal to zero if the
variable is missing, denoted response dummies. The ten interaction terms and the
ten response dummies are included as regressors. The coefficient of an interaction
term can be interpreted as the estimated effect of reported satisfaction with that
amenity on migration plans of respondents who choose to rank the amentity. The
basic empirical specification is:
                   1    if  Exit
*
jit ≥  0,  
   Exitjit =





jit  =  α 0t + Personjitαααα 1 + Σ k(α 2kSatisfactionkjitDkjit + α 3kDkjit) + α 4Municipal feeit +
    α 5Unemploymentit + α 6Wage rateit + α 7House priceit + ε jit,
where Exitjit is reported migration plans by respondent j in municipality i and year t,
Exit
*
jit is the corresponding latent variable, Personjit is a vector of personal
characteristics, Satisfactionkjit is reported satisfaction with amenity k, and Dkjit is a
response dummy which is unity if respondent j in municipality i and year t answered
the question about amenity k. The year effects, α 0t, are included to capture the
effects of general economic conditions on household mobility. 
If unobservable factors are correlated among respondents from the same
geographical unit, estimated standard errors may be biased (Moulton 1990). In the
following, I use a robust estimator of variance which allows for municipal random
effects:
                  ε jit = ε i + ξ jit,
where  ε i and ξ jit are assumed to be normally, identically and independently
distributed.
5.2 Regression results
Table 2 presents two probit regressions, one with and one without the amenity
variables. For brevity, coefficients of year dummies and response dummies are not
reported.16
Table 2. Determinants of migration intentions (Probit regressions)
Coef t-value Coef t-value
Age 15-24 1.031 18.669 1.142 22.513
Age 25-29 0.883 13.793 0.971 16.800
Age 30-34 0.724 12.472 0.801 15.409
Age 35-49 0.564 10.447 0.609 12.401
Age 50-54 0.475 8.328 0.496 9.491
Age 55-66 0.348 6.396 0.347 6.805
Male 0.007 0.351 0.033 1.656
High school 0.197 6.085 0.184 5.884
College 0.475 12.654 0.465 11.944
Married -0.219 -5.880 -0.232 -6.115
Family -0.139 -5.500 -0.164 -7.267
Unemployed 0.218 4.397 0.248 4.966
Out of workforce 0.170 6.636 0.170 6.502
Mover 0.478 11.677 0.546 14.615
Children -0.046 -2.728
Primary education -0.035 -2.871
Culture -0.060 -5.396
Primary health care 0.003 0.384





Higher education -0.033 -4.666
Municipal fee 0.130 1.431 0.171 1.608
Unemployment 7.043 3.457 7.628 3.262
Wage rate -2.069 -1.872 -3.942 -3.309
House price 0.385 3.169 0.343 2.444
Log L -10911 -11244
Log L at zero -12809
Notes: t-values adjusted for municipal random effects.
Year dummies and response dummies included.
Sample size = 60.186.17
With the exception of the dummy for gender, the coefficients of all personal
characteristics are statistically significant at the 1% level and have the expected
sign. Other things equal, being young, single, unemployed and a previous mover
with a college degree increases the probability of migration.
Eight out of ten amentity variables have the expected negative sign and are
statistically significant. The exceptions are primary health care and care for the
elderly. These variable have a positive impact on out-migration and the effect of care
for the elderly is significant at the 5% level. One possible interpretation is that young
people are reluctant to move from their parents if municipal care for the elderly is not
of sufficient quality.
5 The results reported in Table 2 suggest that municipalities are
able to slow down out-migration flows by improving living conditions for children and
the quality of primary education and cultural services at the expense of primary
health care and care for the elderly.  
The estimated effects of municipal fees and area economic variables are also as
expected. The coefficients of fees, unemployment and house prices are not much
affected by omission of amenity variables; municipal fees are insigificant in both
regressions, and unemployment and house prices are significant in both
regressions. Controlling for amenities seems to be most important for the estimated
effect of wages. With amenity variables, the coefficient has the expected negative
sign but is statistically insignificant. Without amenity variables, the absolute value of
the coefficient is nearly doubled and the coefficient becomes highly significant.
The results reported in Table 2 suggest that omitted amenities cannot explain why
                    
5 An alternative interpretation is that (minus) the variable captures the effects of omitted municipal
services.18
many studies find weak effects of unemployment and wage differentials on
migration. In fact, the opposite is the case: the estimated effects of personal
unemployment, local unemployment and, in particular, local wages, become weaker
when controls for amenities are included. Thus, if anything, analyses without
amenity variables tend to overstate the importance of local labour markets for
migration.
The effects of amenities, fees and area economic variables on migration plans may
depend on personal characteristics. The probit regression reported in Table 3
includes interaction terms with a dummy for college degree and a dummy for
whether the respondent is 50 years or older; only interaction terms that are
significant at the 10% level are included.
6 For brevity, coefficients of personal
characteristics are not reported.
                    
6 The main results are robust with respect to variation in the threshold value of the age dummy.
Interaction terms with other personal characteristics than age and education level were generally not
significant.19
Table 3. Inclusion of interaction terms with dummies for age and education level
Coef t-value
Children -0.060 -3.653
Children * Age≥ 50 0.057 2.501
Primary education -0.034 -2.796
Culture -0.040 -3.059
Culture * College -0.048 -3.212
Primary health care 0.003 0.346
Care for the elderly 0.036 3.360





Higher education -0.033 -4.728
Municipal fee 0.213 1.901
Municipal fee * College -0.228 -1.916
Unemployment 8.594 4.131
Unemployment * Age≥ 50 -6.552 -3.964
Wage rate -1.975 -1.815
House price 0.384 3.132
Log L -10886
Notes: t-values adjusted for municipal random effects.
Personal characteristics, year dummies and response dummies included. Sample size = 60.186.
All interaction terms have the expected sign. A negative and significant effect of
living conditions for children and a positive and significant effect of care for the
elderly on migration plans are found only for people below 50. The effect of cultural
services is strongest for respondents with a college degree. Municipal fees matter
only for those without a college degree, and local unemployment is most important
to people below 50.
To examine the practical importance of the various explanatory variables, out-20
migration probabilities based on the probit equation reported in Table 3 have been
computed for four demographic groups, divided according to age and education
level.









All variables at mean 6.41 3.65 3.00 1.57
One variable one st.dev. above
mean
Children 5.62 3.15 2.97 1.55
Prim. Education 5.95 3.36 2.75 1.42
Culture 5.18 3.28 2.34 1.39
Prim. Health care 6.46 3.69 3.02 1.58
Care for the eld. 7.07 4.07 2.94 1.53
Climate 5.41 3.02 2.46 1.26
Recreation 6.16 3.50 2.86 1.49
Shopping 5.53 3.10 2.52 1.30
Safety 6.10 3.46 2.83 1.47
Higher education 5.75 3.24 2.64 1.37
Municipal fee 6.44 3.38 3.01 1.43
Unemployment (below mean) 5.03 2.79 2.81 1.46
Wage rate 6.05 3.42 2.80 1.45
House price
(below mean)
5.59 3.13 2.56 1.32
Joint effect of six municipal
variables
a 3.68 2.48 2.13 1.38
Notes: The probabilities are computed for a married employed male who has completed high school, lives in
family with less than four members and has lived in the municipality for more than five years. 
aJoint effect of a
one st.dev. increase in Children, Primary education, Culture and Municipal fee, and a one st.dev. decrease in
Primary health care and Care for the elderly.
The first row of Table 4 reports migration probabilities for the benchmark case where21
amenity variables, fees and area economic variables are at their mean values. The
next rows show the effects of increasing one regressor by one standard deviation
(local unemployment and house prices are decreased by one standard deviation). 
Among the amenitity variables, living conditions for children, cultural services, the
climate and shopping opportunities have the strongest effects on exit decisions.
Among the area economic variables, local unemployment seems to matter most.
The quantitative effects of municipal services are clearly of practical importance. The
last row shows the joint effect of raising reported satisfaction with living conditions
for children, primary education and cultural services by one standard deviation,
increasing municipal fees by one standard deviation and reducing reported
satisfaction with primary health care and care for the elderly by one standard
deviation.
7 The effect on people aged 30 with a college degree is quite strong: the
out-migration probability is reduced by 2.73 percentage points, or 44%. The effect is
smaller for the other demographic groups, in particular for people aged 60 without a
college degree. The results thus indicate that municipalities are indeed able to affect
the size and composition of their population.
6. Sensitivity analysis
This section presents some robustness tests. I first drop 'Don't know' respondents
from the sample rather than pooling them with respondents who report that they do
not plan to exit the resident municipality. The main results do not change: the
coefficients and t-statistics of amenity variables, municipal fees and area economic
                    
7 To assess whether such a policy change is compatible with the municipal budget constraint, we need to
examine the relation between municipal spending and reported satisfaction with municipal services.22
variables are not much affected.
The second robustness check is to include yearly changes in fees and area
economic variables as regressors. If mobility costs are low, we would expect location
decisions to depend on changes in local fiscal and economic conditions. Again, the
main results appear robust. The estimated effects of the additional regressors are
generally small and insignificant. The only exception is change in local
unemployment which has a positive and borderline significant impact on migration
plans. However, inclusion of change in local unemployment hardly affects the
estimated effects of other explanatory variables.
   
I next consider a potential source of reverse causality known as cognitive
dissonance in the psychology literature.
8 Persons like to view themselves as having
made correct decisions. One possible explanation of the negative coefficients of
amenity variables in the migration equation is that respondents who have decided to
move from the municipality attempt to legitimize their decision by forming negative
judgements of local amenities. If this is the case, the amenity variables are
endogenous and should be instrumented.
The two stage conditional maximum likelihood estimator suggested by Rivers and
Vuong (1988) produces consistent coefficient estimates in limited dependent
variables models when explanatory variables are endogenous. In the first stage, a
set of regressions are estimated explaining reported satisfaction as a function of
exogenous variables. At least one of these variables must be excluded from the
migration regression. The variable I use for this purpose, is average satisfaction
                    
8 Akerlof and Dickens (1982) pioneered economic applications of cognitive dissonance theory.23
reported by other respondents in the same municipality. Personal characteristics are
also included as explanatory variables in the first stage regressions. In the second
stage, the residuals of the first stage regressions are included in the migration
regression together with the amenity variables.
The results indicate that reverse causality is not important. Most first stage residuals
are insignificant in the second stage regression. Only three residuals, those of
primary education, care for the elderly and shopping opportunities, are significant at
the 10% level. Table 5 presents migration regressions with these three residuals as
regressors; for brevity, coefficients of residuals are not reported.  
Table 5. Instrumental variable estimates
Coef t-value Coef t-value
Children -0.050 -3.033 -0.059 -3.816
Children * Age≥ 50 0.037 1.731
Primary education -0.151 -2.435 -0.154 -2.517
Culture -0.060 -5.466 -0.040 -3.044
Culture * College -0.049 -3.285
Primary health care 0.003 0.422 0.003 0.383
Care for the elderly 0.076 2.706 0.071 2.555
Climate -0.067 -6.231 -0.067 -6.199
Recreation -0.045 -4.595 -0.044 -4.524
Shopping -0.092 -4.550 -0.092 -4.612
Safety -0.038 -3.422 -0.038 -3.404
Higher education -0.024 -3.214 -0.025 -3.285
Municipal fee 0.167 1.851 0.247 2.246
Municipal fee * College -0.226 -1.902
Unemployment 7.001 3.543 8.507 4.193
Unemployment * Age≥ 50 -6.430 -3.931
Wage rate -1.116 -0.937 -1.008 -0.857
House price 0.347 2.757 0.345 2.709
Log L -10900 -10878
Notes: t-values adjusted for municipal random effects.
Personal characteristics, year dummies, response dummies and first stage residuals included. Sample size =
60.186.24
Comparison with Tables 2 and 3 shows that the main conclusions are not affected.
Contrary to what could be expected, the estimated effects of reported satisfaction
with primary education, care for the elderly and shopping opportunities on migration
plans actually become stronger. The interaction term between reported satisfaction
with care for the elderly and the age dummy becomes insignificant, but simulations
suggest that the effect on migration plans remains stronger for people below 50. The
coefficients of the other amenity variables are hardly affected. 
The final robustness check is to consider alternative specifications of the amenity
variables. When the level of reported satisfaction is included as regressor, it is
implicitly assumed that the response categories are equally spaced in the sense that
an increase in reported satisfaction from 1 to 2 has the same impact on migration
plans as an increase from 2 to 3, etc. An alternative approach, which may be more
robust to variation in the subjective distance between response categories, is to
create dummy variables turned on if reported satisfaction exceeds a given threshold.
Table 6 presents migration regressions with dummy variables which are unity if
reported satisfaction exceeds mean satisfaction; other thresholds produce very
similar results.25
Table 6. Results with alternative amenity variables      
Coef t-value Coef t-value
Children -0,068 -3,329 -0.099 -4.260
Children * Age≥ 50 0.120 2.316
Primary education -0.093 -3.051 -0.092 -3.067
Culture -0.166 -7.628 -0.127 -4.518
Culture * College -0.101 -2.725
Primary health care -0.044 2.030
Primary health care * Age≥ 50 -0.088 -2.029
Care for the elderly 0.061 2.452 0.066 2.481
Care for the elderly * Age≥ 50 -0.047 -0.942
Climate -0.124 -5.196 -0.125 -5.176
Recreation -0.095 -4.557 -0.093 -4.499
Shopping -0.126 -6.083 -0.128 -6.202
Safety -0.009 -0.384 -0.009 -0.391
Higher education -0.130 -5.631 -0.134 -5.764
Municipal fee 0.151 1.693 0.218 2.003
Municipal fee * College -0.188 -1.565
Unemployment 7.971 3.811 9.570 4.489
Unemployment * Age≥ 50 -6.897 -4.223
Wage rate -2.184 -2.000 -2.101 -1.944
House price 0.415 3.214 0.403 3.047
Log L -10991 -10969
Notes: t-values adjusted for municipal random effects.
Personal characteristics, year dummies and response dummies included. Sample size = 60.186.
The main results do not change: with the exception of primary health care, the
coefficients of all amenity variables, including interaction terms, have the same sign
as in Tables 2-3, and most coefficients remain statistically significant. The
coefficients of area economic variables are hardly affected. The negative estimated
effect of reported satisfaction with primary health care on migration plans of people
aged 50 and above confirms our earlier conclusion that improvement of health care
services will cause an increase in the population share of elderly households.26
7. Conclusion
The main results of the paper can be summarized as follows. First, municipal fees
and services matter for migration decisions. The estimated effects are quantitatively
important and differ between demographic groups. Norwegian municipalities can
increase the population share of young, educated households by improving living
conditions for children and the quality of schools and cultural services, reducing the
quality of primary health care and care for elderly and raising municipal fees.
Second, capitalization of amenities cannot explain weak effects of local economic
conditions on migration. The estimated effects of personal unemployment, local
unemployment and local wages on migration plans become weaker, not stronger,
when amenitity variables are included. These conclusions survive a number of
robustness tests.27
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